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By enacting the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
(FDCA), Congress gave the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) au-
thority to regulate medical devices after their market distribution.1 The
FDA focused exclusively on "quack" devices until the 1960s2 when manu-
facturers began introducing new medical devices, such as heart pacemak-
ers and kidney dialysis units, to the medical community. A 1970 study
headed by Dr. Theodore Cooper, Director of the National Heart and
Lung Institute, found that medical devices contributed to 10,000 injuries
and concluded that there was a need for FDA approval of medical de-
vices before their distribution on the market.4 Medical device manufac-
turers argued that these injuries were due mainly to misuse, not faulty
design or manufacture. 5 The study's authors disagreed with the manufac-
turers and called for more legislation that would enable the FDA to regu-
late and approve medical devices before manufacturers distributed their
1. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.3 (1975).
2. S. REP. No. 33, supra note 1, at 3. "Quack" devices were sold to consumers and
did not perform as promised and sometimes posed a health risk as well as an economic
detriment to the purchaser. Id. The FDA also concentrated on the labeling of medical
devices and made numerous seizures of misbranded and fraudulent devices. In the 1940s,
the FDA seized a $90 lamp that supposedly could cure diabetes, cancer, tuberculosis, and
syphilis. Id. The FDA also seized the "Magic Spike," a gadget that sold for $300, but was
worth only one two-thousandths of a cent. The "Magic Spike" manufacturer claimed its
radioactive powers could cure any disease known to mankind. Id. at 4.
3. Id. at 5. These medical devices were a result of new medical discoveries made
during the post World War II era. Due to the devices' complexity, the FDA could no
longer rely on expert testimony to prove that they were unsafe. Consequently, the FDA
began testing the devices it suspected of violating the law. This testing was time consum-
ing, and the FDA found itself in longcourt battles. Id. at 5-6.
4. Id. Of those 10,000 injuries, 731 resulted in death. "For example, 512 deaths and
300 injuries were attributed to heart valves; 89 deaths and 186 injuries to heart pacemakers;
10 deaths and 8,000 injuries to intrauterine devices." Id
5. Mary G. Boguslaski, Classification and Performance Standards Under the 1976
Medical Device Amendments, 40 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 421, 423 (1985).
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devices to the market.6
In 1976, Congress recognized the need for regulating medical devices
before their distribution and amended the FDCA with the Medical De-
vice Amendments (MDA).7 Congress intended the MDA to protect the
public health by ensuring that all medical devices are safe and effective
both before and after market distribution.8
Anticipating the inevitable conflict between the FDA's medical device
regulations and state regulations, Congress provided an express preemp-
tion clause in the MDA. The clause states that the MDA will preempt
any state "requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any
[FDA] requirement... which relates to the safety and effectiveness of the
device." 9 The FDA promulgated a rule expanding Congress' preemption
6. Id. at 423-24.
7. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
. 8. H.R. CoNP. REP. No. 1090, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976); S. REP. No. 33, supra
note 1, at 2; Jerald A. Jacobs, FDA Premarket Approval of New Medical Devices: Confi-
dentiality of Data, 35 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 576, 576 (1980). The enactment of the MDA
halted the FDA's practice of classifying devices as drugs for the sole purpose of regulating
the devices before market distribution. Paul G. Rogers, Medical Device Law - Intent and
Implementation, 36 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 4, 4 (1981).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1988).
State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivi-
sion of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device in-
tended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
(b) Exempt requirements
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the Secretary may,
by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral hearing, ex-
empt from subsection (a) of this section, under such conditions as may be pre-
scribed in such regulation, a requirement of such State or political subdivision
applicable to a device intended for human use if-
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this chapter
which would be applicable to the device if an exemption were not in effect
under this subsection; or
(2) the requirement-
(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be in
violation of any applicable requirement under this chapter.
Following Congress' lead, the FDA promulgated regulations providing that:
after May 28, 1976, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or
continue in effect any requirement with respect to a medical device intended for
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provision and defined a "state requirement" as any state "statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, or court decision."' 10
In King v. Collagen Corp.," the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit examined the FDA's definition of "state requirement." The
court held that when the FDA regulates any aspect of the claim through
its medical device rules, the FDA's "state requirement" definition encom-
passed judicial decisions resulting from state common law claims 12
brought against medical device manufacturers. 3 Therefore, the First Cir-
cuit concluded that federal law preempts state common law claims against
medical device manufacturers in cases where the FDA regulates an aspect
of the device the common law claim alleges to be unlawful. 4 This hold-
ing effectively allows manufacturers to be insulated against state common
law claims when there is a judicial determination that the FDA's rules
already regulate the allegations in the claims. As such, not only are medi-
cal device manufacturers shielded from liability, but injured plaintiffs are
left without an adequate remedy. 15
This Note first explains the FDA's classification system for medical de-
vices. Such an understanding of the system is necessary before beginning
an analysis of the King decision. After establishing that foundation, this
Note then delves into the facts of the King decision and analyzes it, utiliz-
ing other cases involving medical devices. This Note concludes that
neither the MDA nor its legislative history intended to create a blanket
preemption of state common law claims alleging that FDA-approved
medical devices are unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, courts should
not preempt, under the guise that the FDA's rules are in compliance with
congressional intent, the only effective remedy plaintiffs have against
medical device manufacturers.
human use having the force and effect of law (whether established by statute,
ordinance, regulation, or court decision), which is different from, or in addition
to, any requirement applicable to such device under any provision of the act and
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement applicable to the device under the act.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1994).
10. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1994).
11. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
12. This Note's discussion of state common law claims is intended to include the term
"state tort claims."
13. King, 983 F.2d at 1137.
14. Id.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 66-69.
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I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS
The MDA established a plan in which the FDA categorizes medical
devices into three classes. 16 The FDA regulates: Class I devices through
general controls,'7 Class II devices through compliance with FDA per-
formance standards, 8 and Class III devices, considered the most risk-
laden,' 9 through premarket approval applications (PMA).2 °
The MDA allows a manufacturer two routes to obtain FDA premarket
approval for a new medical device.2 ' Under the simpler route, known as
"510(k) notification,, 2 2 the manufacturer may avoid extensive review.23
Before marketing a medical device, a manufacturer must submit a notifi-
cation to the FDA demonstrating that the new device is "'substantially
equivalent' to a 'predicate' device marketed before enactment of the 1976
Amendments or to a post-1976 product that [has] already been found by
the FDA to be substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device.",24 To help
demonstrate that the device is substantially equivalent to a device already
16. 21 U.S.C. § 360c (1988).
17. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
18. Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
19. Ellen J. Flannery, The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990: An Overview, 46 FoOD
DRUG COSM. L.J. 129, 130-31 (1991).
20. 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)(C). With pre-existing devices, the FDA failed to establish
performance standards for Class II devices and did not require PMAs from many Class III
devices. Consequently, Congress enacted the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Safe
Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). It requires manufacturers to submit any information relat-
ing to pre-existing medical devices, including adverse safety or effectiveness data. It also
requires the FDA to conduct a rule making by December 1, 1995, in order to classify pre-
existing devices into one of the three classes. Any device which remains classified as a
Class III device will have to submit a PMA to be approved by the FDA. Flannery, supra
note 19, at 135.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 360e; Jacobs, supra note 8, at 576.
22. Flannery, supra note 19, at 130.
23. Jacobs, supra note 8, at 577.
24. Flannery, supra note 19, at 130. In the Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Con-
gress added a section to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, codifying the defini-
tion of "substantial equivalence." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (1988). "A new device is
'substantially equivalent' to a predicate device if it has the same intended use and the same
technological characteristics as the predicate device." Id. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(i); Flannery,
supra note 19, at 132. Nevertheless, "substantial equivalence" may still be found even if
the technological characteristics are different as long as two conditions are met: clinical
data is submitted demonstrating the device's safety and effectiveness, and questions of
safety and effectiveness are not raised that are different from those of the predicate device.
21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii); Flannery, supra note 19, at 132. If the predicate device has
been removed from the market, the new device cannot be found to be "substantially
equivalent." 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(2); Flannery, supra note 19, at 132.
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on the market, the manufacturer must submit to the FDA data on the
type and use of the device, as well as labels, inserts, and/or
advertisements.25
If a manufacturer's new device is not determined to be substantially
equivalent, it automatically will be classified as a Class III device, and the
manufacturer must submit a PMA, taking the more difficult route to re-
ceiving FDA premarket approval of its device.26 The manufacturer may
attempt to have the new device reclassified into Class I or Class II to
avoid the requirement of submitting a PMA; however, the FDA requires
the "same quality and quantity of information and data before down
classing a device from Class III as is demanded in a [PMA] full safety and
efficacy review."27 When submitting its PMA, the manufacturer must
also submit "a 'full' statement of the components, ingredients, and
properties of the device; a 'full' description of the methods used in, and
the facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, processing, and,
when relevant, packing and installation of the device."28 The FDA
utilizes the data detailed in the PMA, including clinical studies, to ex-
amine the device's safety and effectiveness.29 Advisory panels that study
the PMAs have "the important statutory role of peer review of medical
and scientific results achieved with the product in pre-clinical and clinical
testing. ,30
II. FACTS OF KING V. COLLAGEN CORP.
Jane King brought suit against Collagen Corporation (Collagen), alleg-
25. Jacobs, supra note 8, at 577. The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 also codified
the requirement that the manufacturer of the new medical device submit information re-
garding the safety and effectiveness of the device, including adverse effects. Flannery,
supra note 19, at 132.
26. Flannery, supra note 19, at 133.
27. Jacobs, supra note 8, at 577.
28. Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right Direc-
tion Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 511, 519-20
(1988).
29. Vincent A. Bucci & John B. Reiss, Technology Assessment of Medical Devices
Under Medicare: Who Should Examine "Safety and Effectiveness"? 40 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 445, 453 (1985). For further discussion of PMAs, refer to Paul V. Buday, 510(k)s and
PMAs: Successfully Meeting Regulatory Demands to Commercialize Medical Devices, 42
,FoOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 559, 564-65 (1987).
30. Jacobs, supra note 8, at 578. The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990 amended the
MDA so that advisory panels are no longer mandatory. The FDA may still submit a PMA
to an advisory panel if a manufacturer requests it or if the FDA desires to submit it, unless
the PMA "substantially duplicates" information already reviewed by the advisory panel.
Flannery, supra note 19, at 134.
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ing that she was injured by its medical device, Zyderm.31 Collagen devel-
oped Zyderm in the early 1970s and began marketing it in the early
1980s.32 The FDA classified it as a Class III medical device.33 Consisting
of processed cow tissue, Zyderm is sold to correct wrinkles and other skin
deformities through injection underneath the skin..34
In 1987, soon after Ms. King received a test dose of Zyderm, she began
to suffer from muscle and joint pains. 31 Ms. King's doctor diagnosed her
with an autoimmune disease known as dermatomyositis/polymyositis,
which causes one's immune system to attack "skin and muscle tissue as if
it were' a foreign substance."36
Ms. King brought her claim against Collagen in 1990. 31 She alleged
seven claims: Collagen was strictly liable for her injuries because Zyderm
was unsafe for its intended purpose and was unreasonably dangerous to
users; Zyderm was sold in breach of the warranty of merchantability be-
cause it was not safe for its intended use; Collagen was negligent in de-
signing, manufacturing, marketing, and selling Zyderm; Collagen
misbranded and/or mislabeled Zyderm; Collagen made misrepresenta-
tions of material fact; Collagen failed to warn her of any defective condi-
tion; and, Collagen fraudulently obtained FDA approval.38 Granting
Collagen's motion for summary judgment, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts held that "the implants in this
case are subject to the specific, detailed requirements of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and, therefore, the plaintiffs claims are pre-empted. ' 39
Ms. King appealed the district court's decision."
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed sum-
mary judgment in favor of Collagen on the basis of the express preemp-
tion clause in the MDA.n' The appellate court held that the FDA's
approval process provided a reasonable assurance that medical devices
are safe and that § 360k of the MDA preempted plaintiff's common law
31. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1132 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84
(1993).
32. Id. at 1131.
33. Id.
34. Id. Usually six applications over several weeks are needed. Id.




39. King v. Collagen Corp., No. 90-12718-MA, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9020, at *2 (D.
Mass. Feb. 3, 1992).
40. King, 983 F.2d at 1132.
41. Id. at 1137.
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claims of strict liability, breach of warranty of merchantability, negli-
gence, misbranding, misrepresentation, failure to warn, and fraud be-
cause the FDA regulates not only the labeling and packaging of the
device, but also the manufacturing methods. 2 The court stated that Ms.
King's claims, if successful, would create a state requirement in addition
to, and different from, the FDA's regulations concerning the safety and
effectiveness of Zyderm. 3 The court found Ms. King's claims expressly
preempted because § 360k forbids state requirements that differ from or
surpass the FDA's regulations of medical devices, unless exempted by
§ 360k(b)."
King is the first federal appellate court decision holding that the FDA's
regulations are so encompassing as to automatically preempt any state
common law claim brought due to an injury caused by a Class III medical
device.4 5 Although Class III medical devices are considered the most
risk-laden 4 6 the appellate court reasoned that preemption of state com-
mon law claims was appropriate due to the FDA's extensive regulation of
these devices.47 Therefore, once the FDA approves a Class III medical
device, the device manufacturer is ensured against any state common law
liability arising from injuries caused by the device.
The King decision prohibits consumers from suing Class III medical
device manufacturers whose products have the FDA's premarket stamp
of approval, even where design or manufacturing flaws are detected.48
One of Ms. King's attorneys claims that, "[t]here's no legal recourse for
consumers under this decision if something goes wrong. It takes away
everything. ,4
9
42. Id. at 1135-37. The court held that for Ms. King to state a claim of fraud, she
would have to be in privity with Collagen. Id. at 1136. The court noted that she was not in
privity with Collagen because it sold its product directly to her physician. Id. Neverthe-
less, the court noted that "the fraud claim is, at bottom, a failure to warn claim. It seeks to
show that Collagen had a duty to provide different information in Zyderm's packaging and
labeling than that which was approved by the FDA. As such, the claim is preempted ex-
pressly by the MDA." Id.
43. Id. at 1135-37.
44. Id at 1134-37.
45. Panel Bars Product Liability Suit, Bus. INs., Jan. 25, 1993, at 70.
46. Flannery, supra note 19, at 130-31.
47. See King, 938 F.2d at 1135-37.
48. Linda Himelstein, An Invincible Shield for Medical Manufacturers, Bus. WK., Aug.
9, 1993, at 73.
49. Christopher Dauer, Product Liability Exposure Reduced By Appeals Court, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Feb. 1, 1993, at 6,
25.
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III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE MDA
Federal preemption is a well established Constitutional doctrine. It ex-
tends from the Supremacy Clause of Article Six, the purpose of which is
balancing power between the states and the federal government.5 0 The
Supremacy Clause grants federal law precedence over state or local law."
However, not every federal law preempts state law. To determine
whether federal law takes priority over state law, a court will examine the
wording of the federal statute or regulation.52 A court may find that
Congress intended to preempt state law due to the statute's express word-
ing.53 Furthermore, absent an express preemption clause, a court may
infer preemption where a state law conflicts with the federal law.5 4
Where the federal law so thoroughly occupies a field, a court may find
preemption on the ground that Congress could not have intended to
leave room for states to legislate in the same area.55 Federal law with a
preemptive effect not only includes the Constitution, treaties, and stat-
utes, but federal regulations promulgated by federal agencies acting
within the scope of their congressionally delegated authority as well.56 If
preemption is based on a federal regulation, the court's inquiry is limited
to a determination of whether the administrator "has exceeded his statu-
tory authority or acted arbitrarily., 57
Balancing the interests of the states with the federal government in the
field of health regulation has been challenging for courts. The Supreme
Court in 1985 indicated in Hillsborough County, Florida v. Automated
Medical Laboratories, Inc.58 that regulation of health and safety matters
50. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419 (1992); see Fidelity Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Author-
ity of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 427 (1819).
52. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2036 (1992).
53. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
54. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
55. Fidelity Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,153 (1982) (quoting
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)),
56. Id. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
57. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 153-54 (citing United States v. Shimer,
367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961)).
58. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
Medical Device Manufacturer Liability
primarily and historically has been the exclusive concern of the states;
therefore, the Court stated that without an express intent of Congress to
preempt state law, courts should presume that federal law is not to super-
sede state law.59 In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit expanded this deference to states in Abbot v. American
Cyanamid Co.,6" holding that a court should recognize a strong presump-
tion against preemption of rehedies, such as tort recoveries, when federal
regulation does not provide an alternative remedy. 6'
The MDA expressly preempts state and local requirements that differ
from, or add to, the federal regulation of medical. devices which relate to
the devices' safety or efficacy, unless the FDA approves an exception to
the MDA's express preemption clause.62 The FDA's regulation expands
§ 360k and requires preemption of court, decisions which are different
from, or in addition to, its medical device regulations. 3 Effectively, the
FDA increased the preemptive effect of § 360k by including court deci-
sions in its regulations, despite the absence of such a requirement in
§ 360k. 4 From the Supreme Court's decision in Hillsborough,65 that the
regulation of health and safety matters has historically been in the exclu-
sive realm of the states, it follows that courts should not allow preemption
of common law claims involving medical devices without an express man-
date from Congress.
Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to preempt states' interest in
protecting their citizens through the adjudication of traditional common
law claims,66 unless Congress has expressly provided for preemption. 7
59. Id. at 719.
60. 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988).
61. Id. at 1112.
62. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1988). To qualify for an exception, the FDA must determine
that:'(1) the state or local government's regulation is more stringent than the FDA's re-
quirement; (2) the state or local government's requirement is compelled due to local condi-
tions; and (3) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to violate any
FDA medical device requirement. Id. § 360k(b).
63. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1994). :
64. 21 U.S.C. § 360k; see supra note 9 for full text of § 360k.
65. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985).
66. "By imposing liability for tortious conduct and affording an avenue for compensa-
tion of injuries, the state looks after the well-being of its citizenry through the exercise of
its historic police powers." Marilyn P. Westerfield, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What
Does Congress Want? 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 263, 270 (1989).
67. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984); Ferebee v. Chevron
Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). Before a
court can conclude that federal regulations-which traditionally set minimum standards-
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Courts have been hesitant to preempt traditional common law tort ac-
tions because injured plaintiffs are left without a remedy and parties en-
gaged in tortious conduct are granted immunity from liability.68
Preemption of state common law claims involving medical devices in the
absence of an express mandate from Congress leaves plaintiffs harmed by
medical devices without an adequate remedy69 and guarantees manufac-
turers immunity from liability for any damages caused by their products.
In defending common law claims for medical devices other than Class
III medical devices, manufacturers have argued that the MDA expressly
preempts plaintiffs' claims. Manufacturers have asserted this argument in
cases involving tampons, intrauterine devices, and intraocular lenses.
Some courts have agreed that the MDA preempts these claims, whereas
others have not. This Note discusses the opinions of these cases and in-
corporates them into the analysis of the King decision.
A. Class II Medical Devices-Tampons
A tampon is a device a woman inserts into the vagina during her men-
strual period to absorb menstrual flow. The FDA requires all tampon
products to be accompanied by warnings of Toxic Shock Syndrome
(TSS), a deadly disease arising from the use of tampons.7°
1. Inadequate Warnings Claims
Courts have taken three different views as to whether the MDA and
the FDA regulations preempt all TSS inadequate warnings claims. The
first view is that the MDA requires blanket preemption of all such inade-
quate warnings claims.7 The second view is that the MDA does not pre-
have preempted the ability of states to protect their citizens through the judicial process,
they should wait for a "clear statement of congressional intent to work such an alteration."
Id. at 1543.
68. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 664 (1954).
"[The legislature's] silence takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to pro-
vide any federal remedy for persons injured .... It is difficult to believe that Congress
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured ....
Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
69. 21 U.S.C. § 360h (1988). The MDA provides a remedy for a device the Secretary
determines is unreasonably dangerous; these remedies include requiring the manufacturer
to repair the device, replace the device, or refund the device's purchase price. However,
the MDA's remedy is inadequate because it does not provide compensation for a plaintiff's
injury or expenses therefrom.
70. 21 C.F.R. § 801.430 (1994).
71. Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.S.C. 1987); Moore
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empt inadequate warnings claims because there is still a question of fact
as to whether the manufacturer complied with the FDA's rules.72 The
third view is that the MDA does not preempt inadequate warnings claims
because tampon warnings are not an FDA requirement due to the fact
manufacturers may draft them in their own words.73
The first view on preemption of tampon inadequate warnings claims is
that the MDA preempts all the claims. The United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina offered two reasons in Stewart v. Inter-
national Playtex, Inc.74 for MDA preemption of plaintiff's TSS inade-
quate warnings claims." 5 The court stated that the goal of the MDA is to
achieve uniform regulations of medical devices. It also noted the FDA's
expansion of the statute to include court decisions within the definition of
a state rule that can be preempted by the MDA.76 The court found that
plaintiff's claim sought to establish a tort labeling requirement through a
court decision which could differ from, or add to, the existing FDA re-
quirement; therefore, it decided that the MDA's goal of uniform regula-
tions could be achieved only if the MDA preempted the claim.77
The Stewart court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case should
be decided in accord with Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.78 in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 79 require-
ments represent only minimum guidelines which leave room for states to
adopt additional requirements for pesticide labeling.80 The district court
stated that the MDA, unlike the Act in Ferebee, did not have a savings
clause allowing for state regulations.8 The district court also rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the case should be decided in accord with
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1989); Edmondson v. International
Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571, 1571-72 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
72. Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Ignace v.
Playtex Family Products, Inc., No. 86-C-480-C, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13609 (W.D. Wis.
July 27, 1987).
73. Muzatko v. International Playtex, Inc., No. 85-C-1540, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14281 (E.D. Wis. May 14, 1987).
74. 672 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1987).
75. Id. at 909.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 910.
78. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
79. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136w-3 (1988).
80. Stewart, 672 F. Supp. at 910 (citing Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1542-43).
81. Id.
19951
574 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:563
O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc. 2 in which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld jury instructions requiring the
jury to consider a manufacturer's compliance with the FDA's regulations
as evidence of due care, but allowed the jury to find a tampon manufac-
turer negligent if the jury believed a reasonable tampon manufacturer
would have taken additional precautions.83 The Stewart court held that
the MDA preempted the plaintiff's inadequate warnings common law
claim; therefore, it granted the tampon manufacturer summary
judgment.'
In Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,85 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Stewart court's holding that the
MDA expressly preempted plaintiff's inadequate warnings claim.86 The
court found that the MDA and the FDA's regulations expressly pre-
cluded any contrary state requirement regardless of the source.87 Like-
wise, in Edmondson v. International Playtex, Inc., the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia preempted plaintiff's
inadequate warnings claim on the basis of a magistrate's report stating
that a state court judgment imposed on a medical device manufacturer is
no different than a state legislature imposing a requirement.88
The second view on the preemption of inadequate warnings common
law claims is that the claims are preempted, provided that the manufac-
turer has complied with the federal warning requirements In Rinehart v.
International Playtex, Inc.,89 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana held that the MDA's preemption clause es-
tablishes the FDA's regulation of tampons as the standard to be applied
in common law claims.9" The Rinehart court denied the manufacturer's
motion for summary judgment.9' It found that material issues of fact still
existed as to whether the tampon manufacturer complied with the federal
requirements because manufacturers could choose their own wording for
the TSS warnings.92 In Ignace v. Playtex Family Products, Inc.,9 the
82. 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987).
83. Stewart, 672 F. Supp. at 910 (citing O'Gilvie, 821 F.2d at 1442).
84. Id.
85. 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989).
86. Id. at 247.
87. Id. at 245.
88. Edmondson v. International Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1571, 1571-72 (N.D. Ga.
1987).
89. 688 F. Supp. 475 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
90. Id. at 477.
91. Id. at 478.
92. Id.
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United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held
that the federal regulations for tampons establish the standard by which
the adequacy of warnings is to be judged; therefore, the plaintiff must
show only that the tampon manufacturer's warnings were in violation of
the applicable federal regulations.94
The third view on the preemption of inadequate warnings common law
claims was promulgated by the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Wisconsin in Muzatko v. International Playtex, Inc.95 The
Muzatko court held that the MDA could not preempt plaintiff's inade-
quate warning claim because the contents of the warnings were not an
FDA requirement due to the fact tampon manufacturers were 'allowed to
draft the TSS warnings in their own wvords.96 The court concluded that
the MDA preemption clause did not apply because the warnings were not
a requirement as the "term was intended by Congress' to be
preempted."9
.2. Design Defect Claims
Unlike challenges based on inadequate warnings, it is not disputed that
common law claims based on the design, composition, and construction
of tampons are not preempted The courts in Moore and in Rinehart held
that the FDA did not intend to preempt all state laws and regulations
pertaining to tampons because the FDA's regulations only provide for
preemption when the FDA has promulgated counterpart regulations or
when there are other specific requirements applicable.98 Because the
FDA's requirements for tampons only concern labels and warnings, the
courts held that the MDA did not preempt plaintiff's claims based on
design, composition, and construction of the tampon.99
B. Medical Devices-Intrauterine Devices
An intrauterine device (IUD) is a contraceptive, inserted into a wo-
man's uterus by a physician to prevent pregnancy. In the cases where
plaintiffs claimed an injury due to the use of an IUD, defendant manufac-
93. No. 86-C-480-C, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13609 (W.D. Wis. July, 27, 1987).
94. Id. at *8.
95. Muzatko v. International Playtex, Inc., No. 85-C-1540, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14281 (E.D. Wis. May 14, 1987).
96. Id. at *6.
97. Id.
98. Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1989); Rinehart v.
International Playtex, Inc. 688 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
99. Moore, 867 F.2d at 246; Rinehart, 688 F. Supp. at 478.
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turers argued that the MDA preempts plaintiffs' common law defect and
failure-to-warn claims. United States District Courts in New Jersey and
Minnesota have held that, because the FDA regulates some IUDs as
drugs, not medical devices, the MDA cannot preempt state common law
claims concerning those IUDs regulated as drugs.' In Allen v. G.D.
Searle & Co.,' the United States District Court in Oregon held that the
IUD is, at most, both a device and a drug; however, the MDA's preemp-
tion clause only applies to devices.102 One court could not determine
whether the MDA preempted the plaintiff's claims that the IUD had in-
jured her because there were material questions of fact as to whether the
IUD was a drug or a device. 10 3
Two courts considering whether the MDA's preemption clause applied
to drug IUDs expressed their views of the preemption clause itself. The
United States District Court in Maryland agreed that drug IUDs did not
fall under the MDA; however, it stated further that the MDA's preemp-
tion clause did not preempt state common law claims. 1" The court found
that the language of § 360k indicates that Congress intended to preempt
only state or local legislation and administrative medical device require-
ments, not state common law claims.' 5 As support, the court cited the
legislative history of the MDA and a report from the House Committee
on Interstate Foreign Commerce.'0 6 The court found that the accompa-
nying House Report demonstrates congressional intent for the term "re-
quirement" to refer only to state or local legislative and administrative
programs regulating devices.' 07 The court concluded that the FDA's reg-
ulations108 extending "requirement" to include "court decision" contra-
dict congressional intent and are not based on a permissible construction
of the MDA. 109 The United States District Court in Minnesota agreed,
stating that "even if the court credits defendant's argument that section
360k should apply [to drug IUDs], it is doubtful that the term 'require-
ment' as used in section 360k is broad enough to encompass an action
100. Spychala v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1029 (D.N.J. 1988); Kociemba v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (D. Minn. 1988).
101. 708 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989).
102. Id. at 1151.
103. Tarallo v. Searle Pharmaceutical, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653, 660 (D.S.C. 1988).
104. Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co.. 709 F. Supp. 662, 667-68 (D. Md. 1989).
105. Id. at 667.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1994).
109. Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 668.
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pursued under state tort law."110
C. Investigational Medical Devices-Intraocular Lens Implants
An intraocular lens is a plastic lens implanted after the removal of cata-
racts."' The FDA regulates intraocular lenses pursuant to § 520(g) of
the FDCA, which exempts the investigational uses of a device from the
other provisions of the Act, allowing manufacturers the opportunity to
determine the safety and effectiveness of a device. 112 Nevertheless, the
FDA's regulations relating to intraocular lenses are still subject to the
MDA's express preemption clause." 3
Courts are split over whether common law claims relating to intraocu-
lar lenses are preempted. In Mitchell v. Iolab Corp.,"' the United States
District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana held that the plaintiff's
common law claims were not preempted. It found that common law
claims are not a requirement different from, or in addition to, the FDA
requirement concerning the implanted lenses because federal regulations
clearly state that patients do not waive or release their legal rights by
signing an informed consent agreement.' 1 5 Therefore, it appears that the
Mitchell court restored the plaintiff's right to bring a common law claim,
despite the MDA's express preemption clause. In Slater v. Optical Radia-
tion Corp.,116 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the Mitchell court's application of the preemption provision
to informed consent agreements. However, the court determined that
the FDA's investigational device regulations preempted state common
law claims of negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty
based on intraocular lenses." 7
110. Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (D. Minn. 1988). The
court further noted, "[aibsent statutory or regulatory language or legislative history to the
contrary, the Court reads the statute to only preclude state statutes, regulations, or local
laws regulating medical devices." Id.
111. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (7th Cir. 1992).
112. 21 U.S.C. § 360j (1988).
113. Mitchell v. Iolab Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877, 878 (E.D. La. 1988).
114. Id. at 877.
115. Id.
116. 961 F.2d 1130 (7th Cir. 1992).
117. Id. at 1332-33. In the case of breast implants, one court has held that a plaintiff's
claim is not preempted because the MDA was not in effect at the time the implants were
received. Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.C. Conn. 1989).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF KING V. COLLAGEN CORP.
Prior to King v. Collagen Corp., federal courts were split on the appli-
cation of the MDA's preemption clause to state common law claims.
King is the first federal appellate court decision that completely strikes
down a plaintiff's state common law claims related to a Class III medical
device. 18 In its determination of whether the MDA preempted Ms.
King's state common law claims, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc."1 9 The King opinion stated:
In analyzing preemption, the Court [in Cipollone] relied only on
the specific language of the provision regarding preemption.
The Court reasoned that "Congress' enactment of a provision
defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters
beyond that reach are not preempted." The [Cipollone] opinion
thus analyzed each of petitioner's claims in light of the express
language of the preemption provision .... '20
In accord with Cipollone, the King court examined the specific language
in the MDA preemption clause.12' The court stated that it could not ex-
tend § 360k any further than its language warranted because courts must
respect the relationship between the federal government and the
states.1 22 The court reasoned that states' historic police powers are super-
seded only when Congress clearly intends that result.
1 23
Pursuant to § 360k, the court stated, "we must determine whether ap-
pellant's products liability claims give rise to state law requirements in
addition to or different from those mandated by the FDA.' 1 24 The King
court followed the FDA's interpretation of a state requirement because
the Supreme Court has held that a federal agency's interpretation of its
own statute is controlling as long as it is not contrary to the intent of
118. Panel Bars Product Liability Suit, supra note 45, at 70.
119. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1133 (1st Cir. 1993). In Cipollone, the
plaintiff brought a state common law claim asserting that a cigarette manufacturer failed to
warn of the hazards related to smoking; breached warranties contained in cigarette adver-
tisements; fraudulently misrepresented the hazards of smoking to the public; and conspired
to deprive the public of important health information'. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 2608, 2613 (1992).
120.. King, 983 F.2d at 1133 (citing Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618).
121. Id. at 1134.
122. Id. at 1133.
123. Id. at 1134.
124. Id.
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Congress. 125 Examining the FDA's interpretation of § 360k, the court
stated that a state requirement "may emanate from any requirement es-
tablished by a state including statutes, regulations, court decisions or or-
dinances.' 126 The court determined that a state common law claim is a
state requirement in the form of a court decision. 127 To support its deter-
mination, the court cited dictum in a non-tort, non-preemption case in
which the Supreme Court stated that a court's ability to award damages
and the obligation to pay compensation can be, and is designed to be, a
state method of regulating conduct.
128
The court determined that the FDA extensively regulates all Class III
medical devices, including Zyderm, to ensure that they are reasonably
safe for public use.' 2 9 The FDA's extensive regulations include packag-
ing and labeling, such as warnings and safety information, of the medical
device.13° The FDA must also approve the design and manufacturing
process of Class III medicaldevices.' 3 1 The court proceeded to discuss all
seven of Ms. King's state common law claims: strict liability, breach of
warranty of merchantability, negligence, product misbranding, misrepre-
sentation, failure to warn, and, fraud. The court determined that accord-
ing to Cipollone, the MDA preempted all of these claims because the
FDA extensively regulated Zyderm as a Class III medical device, and
each of her claims would-create a state requirement either different from
or in addition to the FDA's approval of Zyderm.
132
The King court's analysis is flawed in four respects. First, the court did
not discuss whether Congress intended the term "state requirement" in
the preemption clause to include state common law. The court simply
assumed that because the FDA's regulations provide that a state require-
ment may emanate from a court decision, Congress intended the MDA
and the FDA's regulations of medical devices to preempt state common
125. Id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1134-35.
128. Id. at 1134; see Barry J. Nace, New Cases Re-Exahine Preemption, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 2, 1993, at 28 (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247
(1959)).
129. King, 983 F.2d at 1135.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1136.
132. Id. at 1135-36. Cf. Ministry of Health v. Shiley Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1440 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (holding that the MDA preempts claims for negligence, misbranding, failure to
warn, and strict .liability, but not claims for breach of warranty, fraud, and
misrepresentation).
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law. In so doing, the court relied on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,133 in which the Supreme Court held that an
agency's interpretation of its own statute is controlling.13 4 However, the
King court did not address the Supreme Court's determination in Chev-
ron that the federal agency's interpretation is only controlling if the inter-
pretation is not contrary to congressional intent. 35 Moreover, the King
court failed to recognize the Supreme Court's determination in Hillsbor-
ough County, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. that in the
area of health and safety regulation, courts should not presume preemp-
tion of state law, unless expressly stated by Congress. 136
Neither the language of the MDA's preemption clause 137 nor the legis-
lative history demonstrate that Congress intended to preempt state tort
law. Section 360k does not mandate that the MDA preempt state com-
mon law. 138 In fact, the legislative history of the MDA demonstrates that
Congress did not intend to preempt state common law. The House Re-
port accompanying the MDA reveals Congress' concern that an undue
burden would be imposed on interstate commerce if each state were free
to regulate medical devices.' 39 Consequently, Congress provided for the
preemption of state requirements on medical devices. However, the
House Report expresses concern only over state administrative programs
regulating medical devices.'14  The Report does not include state com-
133. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
134. Id. at 865-66.
135. Id.
136. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985).
137. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1988); see supra note 9.
138. 21 U.S.C. § 360k.
139. H.R. REP. No. 94-853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1976).
140. Id. The report states:
The Committee recognizes that if a substantial number of differing requirements
applicable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdictions other than the Federal
government, interstate commerce would be unduly burdened. For this reason,
the reported bill contains special provisions.., governing regulation of devices by
States and localities ....
In the absence of effective Federal regulation of medical devices, some States
have established their own programs. The most comprehensive State regulation
of which the Committee is aware is that of California, which in 1970 adopted the
Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law. This law requires premarket approval
of all new medical devices, requires compliance of device manufacturers with
good manufacturing practices and authorizes inspection of establishments which
manufacture devices. Implementation of the Sherman Law has resulted in the
requirement that intrauterine devices are subject to premarket clearance in
California.
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mon law in its discussion of the MDA's preemption provision. 141 Recog-
nizing this, the Office of the Chief Counsel for the FDA stated:
[t]here is no indication in the legislative history of section 521a
[21 U.S.C. § 360k] that Congress intended that the section pre-
empt State or local requirements respecting general enforce-
ment, including available legal remedies, or State or local
remedies that only incidentally apply to devices. Rules or re-
quirements established by States to govern the legal remedies
available under the State judicial system are not "requirements
with respect to a device" within the meaning of section 521(a) of
the act. 142
The King court's decision that the MDA preempts state common law is
contrary to the legislative history. The decision is based on the mistaken
assumptions that Congress intended preemption and the FDA correctly
interpreted the preemption provision.
In other preemption clauses where Congress has utilized the word "re-
quirement," courts have not automatically presumed the preemption of
state common law. For example, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 143 precludes a state from imposing any re-
quirements in addition to or different from those in the Act. 144 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical, Inc.145 that FIFRA's preemption provi-
sion expressly preempting "state requirements," did not preempt state
damage actions. 146 Furthermore, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act 147 contains a preemption clause which declares that "[n]o
requirement or prohibition . , . shall be imposed under state law with
Because there are some situations in which regulation of devices by States and
localities would constitute a useful supplement to Federal regulation, the reported
bill authorizes a State or political'subdivision thereof to petition the Secretary for
exemptions from the bill's general prohibition on non-Federal regulation ....
Id. at 45.
141. Id. at 45-6.
142. Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (quot-
ing Advisory Opinion by Joseph P. Hile, Associate FDA Commissioner for Regulatory
Affairs, Docket No. B3A-0140/AP, Mar. 2, 1984) (emphasis added by court).
143. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136w-3 (1988).
144. Id. § 136v(b).
145. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
146. Id. at 1541; cf. Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 910 (D.S.C.
1987) (distinguishing the MDA and FIFRA preemption clauses by noting that the latter
contains a savings clause allowing for state regulations).
147. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1988).
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respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes."' 48 In Cipol-
lone, the Supreme Court held that the federal act preempted state com-
mon law inadequate warnings claims.149 However, in contrast to King,
the Supreme Court in Cipollone did not preempt all of the plaintiff's state
common law claims.15° The Court left intact alternative remedies.15'
Webster's Dictionary defines "requirement" as "something that is
wanted or needed" or "something that is called for or demanded." '152
From these definitions, one may argue that common law does not compel
or mandate compliance as do legislative or administrative acts.'5 3 Com-
mon law liability may cause the manufacturer to alter its conduct so that
it will not be held liable again, but it does not compel the manufacturer's
response as does the FDA's mandate that a manufacturer meet a require-
ment or forego market distribution.154 Regulated parties must comply
with the law; "[t]ort liability, on the other hand, encourages compliance
by subjecting the defendant to economic pressure."'1 55 Therefore, the
King court's decision to preempt all of Ms. King's common law claims is
misguided because it fails to recognize that there is no clear statement
from Congress in the MDA or its legislative history which directs the
FDA or courts to preempt state common law. Moreover, the King court's
decision fails to reconcile the theory that common law liability does not
148. Id. § 1334 (1988).
149. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2611 (1992). The result in Cipol-
lone may not have been just because the legislative history indicates that Congress did not
intend the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act's preemption clause to include
preemption of state common law. Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Prod-
ucts Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REV., 187, 254-55 (1993).
150. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625; cf Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp.
1426, 1440 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("Under Cipollone, state claims against class III device manu-
facturers survive if the legal duty underlying the state claim either has a basis independent
of the MDA's focus on the medical device's safety and effectiveness, or arises from the
manufacturer and not from the State."). The Ministry of Health court held that claims for
breach of warranty, fraud, and misrepresentation are not preempted. Id. at 1440.
151. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2622-24 (concluding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act does not necessarily preempt claims against cigarette manufacturers
for breach of express warranty, misrepresentation, or conspiracy).
152. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1929 (3d ed. 1986).
153. Ausness, supra note 149, at 254 (noting Justice Blackmun's dissent in Cipollone,
112 S. Ct. at 2627-28). Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, dissented
in Cipollone, asserting that common law damage awards are not the same as administrative
regulations. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2627-28. Moreover, Blackmun noted that common
law claims are different from statutes and administrative regulations because their primary
concern is compensating injured parties. Id. at 2628.
154. Ausness, supra note 149, at 254 (noting Blackmun's dissent in Cipollone, 112 S. Ct.
at 2627-28).
155. Id. at 254. See Nace, supra note 128, at 28.
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require compliance in the same manner as a law or regulation with its
holding to preempt all of Ms. King's claims.
The second flaw in the King decision is that it leaves plaintiffs without
an adequate remedy. In Abbot v. American Cyanamid,156 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that there is a
strong presumption against preempting remedies, such as tort recoveries,
when federal regulation does not provide an alternative remedy.
157
Moreover, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow preemption by
federal regulations without an express statement from Congress to "re-
move all means of judicial recourse for those injured." '158 Although the
MDA provides remedies for plaintiffs aggrieved by devices proven to be
unreasonably dangerous by the FDA, these remedies only providefor the
device's repair, replacement, or refund price.' 59 The MDA does not pro-
vide remedies to compensate plaintiffs for their injuries, such as pain and
suffering, and additional medical care. Hence, plaintiffs are left without
an adequate remedy. One court notes that, "[i]f the intent of Congress
were to nullify an entire body of state consumer protection law, and leave
the victims without a remedy,' it would have specifically said -so.'"16 °
The King decision goes further in its opinion than any prior medical
device common law claims. In the Class II medical device tampon cases
where courts.held that the MDA preempted plaintiffs' state tort claims
for inadequate warnings, the courts allowed claims to go forward based
on negligent design and/or manufacture.16 1 The courts held that the
156. 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988).
157. Id. at 1112.
158. Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987) (quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)).
159. 21 U.S.C. § 360h (1988).
160. Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1440 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating
that the MDA does not create a blanket of federal preemption). The court also noted that
several other courts, following the King precedent, "have expressed misgivings about the
ramifications of leaving plaintiffs without a remedy." Id. at 1438. These cases include:
Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("It must be recog-
nized that state tort actions . . . remain a powerful incentive for improving product
safety."); Cameron v. Howmedica, 820 F. Supp. 317, 321 (E.D. Mich. 1993)
This Court remains concerned with the lack of a criterion-such as an analysis
under the Seventh Amendment-by which these courts are evaluating the rea-
sonableness of a Congressional policy to foreclose victim's common law rights in
exchange for the common good. Therefore, it refuses to join any holding or dicta
that finds Congress has acted in a wise manner in enacting § 360k.
Id
161. Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir. 1989); Rinehart v.
International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 478 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
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MDA did not preempt these claims because the FDA did not regulate
those aspects of the device. 161 Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims could still
be heard by juries with the chance of compensation for their injuries. The
King court takes this chance of compensation away from plaintiffs injured
by a Class III medical device. The King decision prohibits states from
using their police powers to protect citizens' health and safety in this area,
and it does so without regard for the lack of an alternative federal rem-
edy. As such, King is contrary to the Supreme Court's decisions in Hills-
borough,163 Silkwood,164 and Laburnum.165
The third flaw in the King decision is that it conflicts with the MDA
itself. Section 360h clearly denotes that the MDA's remedies, allowing
for repair, replacement, or refund, will not "relieve any person from lia-
bility under Federal or State law. In awarding damages for economic loss
in an action brought for the enforcement of any such liability, the value to
the plaintiff in such action of any remedy provided him under such order
shall be taken into account.' 166 If Congress intended to preempt state
common law, state damages would not be included in this section of the
Act. It appears from this provision that Congress foresaw coexistence
between state law, the MDA, and FDA medical device regulations, yet
the King court does not address this section.
The fourth flaw in the King decision is its assertion that the preemption
clause was "broad, but limited... [and that] the MDA does not preempt
such claims as negligent implantation or removal of devices, or claims
arising out of contaminated devices.' 167 While the court recognized that
the preemption clause is limited, it failed to define those limitations other
than excluding from preemption medical malpractice suits against doctors
who negligently implant or remove a medical device. 168 As far as the
court's limitation on preemption of claims arising out of contaminated
devices, the court's own decision could be read to disregard this limita-
tion, at least for Class III medical devices. The court found that Class III
medical devices are extensively regulated by the FDA, from their labeling
and packaging, to their design and manufacturing.' 69 If a plaintiff alleges
162. Moore, 867 F.2d at 246-47; Rinehart, 688 F. Supp. at 478.
163. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
164. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984).
165. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954).
166. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (1988).
167. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1134 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Slater v. Optical
Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992)).
168. Id. at 1135.
169. Id. at 1135-36.
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that a Class III medical device is contaminated, the plaintiff is ultimately
alleging that the manufacturing was negligent because contamination
would only occur during the manufacturing process. According to the
King court, because the FDA regulates the manufacturing of Class III
medical devices, the MDA and FDA regulations would preempt the con-
tamination claim.170
One must also question the court's refusal to preempt state common
law claims arising from negligent implantation or removal of medical de-
vices.'7 1 If a Class III medical device manufacturer included instructions
to physicians on the proper implantation or removal of the device; and
the FDA, in its approval of the device's labeling and packaging, approved
those instructions as "reasonably safe" for the implantation and removal
of the device, would an injured plaintiff be allowed to make a state com-
mon law claim against a physician for negligence? King instructs courts
to rule that state common law claims are preempted when the FDA has
regulated the aspect of the medical device that a plaintiff claims injuri-
ous. 72 Applying the King decision, a court may preempt the plaintiff's
medical malpractice claim because it could result in a state requirement
that would add or change the medical device's labeling/packaging-al-
ready approved by the FDA. In this situation, a court should inquire
whether the physician followed the FDA's approved instructions included
in the medical device's packaging. If the physician did not follow the
FDA-approved instructions, plaintiff's claim would not be barred.
The courts in Rinehart and Ignace question the reason for preempting
state common law claims based on negligent design, manufacturing, mis-
labeling, and inadequate warnings without considering whether the medi-
cal device manufacturer followed the FDA-approved design,
manufacturing, labeling, and warnings regulations. 173 These courts agree
with the King decision in that the FDA's regulations of medical devices
are the standard to be applied in state common law claims and neither the
court nor the jury can impose additional requirements.174 In contrast to
King, these courts held that there is still a question of fact as to whether
the medical device manufacturer complied with the FDA regulations. 175
170. Id. at 1136.
171. Id. at 1135.
172. Id. at 1134-37.
173. Rinehart v. International Playtex, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D. Ind. 1988);
Ignace v. Playtex Family Products, Inc., No. 86-C-480-C, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13609 at *8
(D.C. Wis. 1987).
174. Rinehart, 688 F. Supp. at 477; Ignace, No. 86-C-480-C at *8.
175. Rinehart, 688 F. Supp. at 477; Ignace, No. 86-C-480-C at *8.
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Therefore, to avoid preemption, plaintiffs alleging negligent manufactur-
ing, mislabeling, or inadequate warnings would have to allege that the
medical device manufacturer violated the applicable FDA regulations be-
cause it did not follow the FDA's standards. 7 6 Applying the Rinehart
and Ignace rationale to Class III medical device common law claims, a
plaintiff would also have to allege that the manufacturer did not follow
the FDA's applicable standards, as well as prove that the manufacturer
deviated from its particular FDA-approved regulations.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit soon followed
King. It held in Stamps v. Collagen Corp."' that the MDA preempts
state common law claims in a suit arising from the use of Zyderm.178
Both King and Stamps have impacted health and safety. In a similar situ-
ation, Shiley, a manufacturer of heart valves (a Class III medical device),
offered a $500 million settlement in 1992 to injured recipients of its FDA-
approved devices.179 Had the King decision already been rendered, this
settlement may have never occurred, and the recipients would have been
deprived of compensation for their injuries. In fact, defendant Shiley is
presently raising the King preemption defense in another case brought by
300 heart valve recipients. 8 ° If King is followed, these plaintiffs will not
be compensated for their injuries. "Indeed, the legal and economic im-
pact of the courts' decisions could be staggering, with hundreds of cases
pending nationwide involving everything from optical implants to hip
prostheses."181
176. Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1439 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating
that the MDA "would not preempt claims that the manufacturer negligently failed to com-
ply with the FDA's regulations, since a finding of wrongdoing would merely impose those
regulations already imposed by the statute, and would not be 'different from or in addition
to' those imposed by the MDA.") (citing Reiter v. Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (preempting plaintiffs strict liability claim, but not its negligent manufac-
ture claim against manufacturer of Class III bone cement)) (emphasis in original).
177. 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993).
178. id. at 1422-23. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also
adopted the reasoning of the King and Stamps courts, holding that the MDA preempts a
plaintiff's state common law claim against an intraocular lens manufacturer. Gile v. Opti-
cal Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542-44 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994). Cf.
Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426 (C.D. Cal. 1994). The Ministry of
Health court disagreed with the King court, and stated that the MDA does not create nor
does Cipollone support complete preemption of all state common law claims. Id. at 1440.
179. Himelstein, supra note 48, at 73.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision to deny Ms. King's.petition for certio-
rari182 leaves her, having been injured from use of a Class III medical
device, without an adequate remedy. Congress did not intend such a
harsh result. It did not expressly preempt state common law, nor did it
intend to preempt plaintiffs' state protection through the judicial process.
A more equitable approach was taken by the courts in Rinehart and
Ignace, where plaintiffs would have the burden of proving that manufac-
turers did not abide by the FDA-approved standards. In contrast, King
gives manufacturers of Class III medical devices a government insurance
policy. Once a manufacturer's medical device is approved, plaintiffs'
state tort law claims are preempted. Under King, plaintiffs injured by a
Class III medical device must rely upon the results of their complaints to
the FDA and hope that others will not be injured as they have.
Angela Woodley Kronenberg
182. King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
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